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Rosetta Stone argues that Google is liable for trademark infringement because: (1) 
AdWo"rds advertisers bid on Rosetta Stone's trademarks as ke},'Words to trigger their ads, and (2) 
some third parties display fhose marks in I~eir ads. Ho~ever, absolutely no evidence in the 
reccrd supports a finding of liability against Google. J\.fere use of a lr2:demark as a keyword, 
without more, does not constitute infringement And there is no evidence of IikeJy confusion 
regarding any ads placed by reseilers of Rosetta Stone products, or review sites discussing 
Rosetta Stone products, or Ros::tta Stone's competitors. The lack of evidence is not surprising 
considering th~ actual ads at issue, which include ads such as the following: 
"Rosetta Lanauaae" sale 
Arnazo{1.cenilRosettaStone Top 'program. new Version 3. Ships ir-<3c, no tax, order today! 
Rosetta Spanish A Scam? 
Read The-sa Re--iews Befon 
8lJyir.g Rosette. Sp«nfsh! 
"'."""N. T opRal edSpanjsh.com 
Learn Spanish in 10 Dsvs Rosetta Storie VS. Othe;s 
100% Guar.anteed or Your Money Back Don-t Buy Rosetta Stone 
Millien::; ofSati;hd Cuslomars{. Until You Read These Reviev/s! 
Iwr",. Rocket Languages .cOIl'JSpanl s h About. comlRo se tta Sto n Q 
It appears that the only "evidence" of confusion regarding Rosetta Stene marks concerns 
consumers who allegedly bought counterfeit Rosetta Stone sorr-Nare. But even this so·called 
Uevidc:nce" is whoily insufficient to support a finding of liability against GoogJe. It cannot be the 
case th2.t by simply offering advertising space on Google.com. Googh:: someh~w induced 
counterfeiters in places. like China to create and sell coltriterfeit versions of Rosetta Stone 
software. Nor is there any record evidence demonstrating that Google eiL,cr knowingly 
permitted any ads for alleged counterfeits to be shoy..ll, or that Google acted in concert with or as 
an agent for such counterfeiters. To the contrary, the record is clear: Google has never condoned 
advertising for counterfeit products. [ndeed, Google expeditiously removes ads by counterfeiters 






owners to prevent eds for counterfeit products from eppearing on Google,com, and it regularly 
works closely with law enforcement egcr.ciGs and trademark owners, including Rosetta Stone 
specifiully, to track down cou.."nerfeiters and disrupt their operations, domestic and international. 
In other \vords, Rosetta Stone's trademark infringement claims, direct and secondary, all fail. 
Nor is Google liable for dilution. Google has never branded any of its products or 
services with Rosetta Stone's trademarks., those trademarks were not famous in 2004, and 
Rcsetta SlOne cannot prove that it will be likely harmed by any "use" Google makes of them. 
Google can also not be held liable for unjust eruichment. Even if revenue earned by GoogJe fo r 
ads involving Rosetta Stone's marks were "unjust," there is no evidence that Google received 
that money with an understanding that it was owed to Rosena Stone, as is required to prevail on 
the claim. Roserta Stone's summary judgment motion should be denizd in its entirety. 
Google's Objections to Rosetta Stone's Statement of Undisputed Facts (uQSF,,)1 
1. Google disputes UF 8 because the referenced study was conducted only last year 
and refers only to the ROSETTA STONE mark. RosettI Stone's brand awareness for 
ROSE1TA STOl'-l"E was less than 16% in August 2005. Rosetta Stone has no evidence relating 
to the strength or equity of ihe other alleged marks, According to Rosetta Stone's documents, 
ROSETTA WORLD is only used in A:;ia. Rosetta Stone's brand equity cnd reputation have not 
declined since 2004. D<claraticn of Margret Caruso ("Caruso Dec!."), Exs. 31-33, 60 at 131:6-
i32:6, 69 at 111:6-17, 112: 1-7, 69 at 120:21-122:8, Declaration of Henry Lien ("Li<n Dec!."), 
Ex. 1; Declaration of lennife, Spaziano ("Spaziano Decl."), Tab A, at Dubow 45:1-46 :2, leffries 
I The Caruso, Lloyd, a.1d Louie cieclarations were submitted with GoogJe ' s Motion for 
Summary Judgment. the Calhoun and Spaziano declarations were submitted with Roset'"ta Smne's 




40: 11-41:20, Doy!. 25: 10-22, Porter 41 :14-24, Tho';'a, 29: 19-30: 17. 
2". GoogJe disputes ur 11 because keywords do not automatica!1y :'trigger the 
d isplay of the advc:rtisers ad." They are one piece of information that Goog!e's systems use to 
determine which ads to ~how in respOilSe [Q a·search query. Caruso Decl., Ex. 64 at 19: 13-21: 18, 
Ex. 52 at 18: 17-20:19, 65: 13-66:8, 100:16-101: 1; Lien Decl, E,_ 23 at 106:15-109:20. 
3. Google-disputes UF 16 because: the characterization that Google sells trademarked 
terms is incorrect and unsupported. Google sells advertising space and allows advertisers to bid 
an trademarked terms as rriggers for ads. Further, Google adopted the 2004 policy in an. effort to 
correct the imbalance· of the prior policy that overly favored trademark owners at the cost of 
users and advertisers. It considered revenue impact. just cS it considers it when adapting any 
policy that may affect revenue. Lien Decl., Ex. 30 -ai 40: 11-41 :23. 
4. Google disputes UF 18 because Go ogle had conducted studies regarding [he use 
of the term "Sponsored Links" as of 2004. Goagle conducted a study in 2000 that showed the 
use of "sponsored link" to denote paid ads did not create a -negative user experience. Google 31so 
conducted a user exp~riment in 2003, which showed that there were only nominal differences in 
click through rates for the terms "advertisement," "paid advertisement" and "sponsored link." 
UF l8' s characterization of subsequent research is also incorrect The EPCOT srudy respondents 
did not use only Google's search engine, and conclusions dravm from the study cannot be 
attributable lO Google alone. Many users do not consider sponsored links <fads," which they 
consid~r to be annoying and intrusive, with pictures and noise, but they do see them as paid for. 
Other users erroneously believe iliat website owners can pay to apRear in the organic search 
results. Thus, any difference between sponsored links and organic links in tenns of payment is 




at 82: 17-83 :21, 102:5-16;142:20-145: 18, 212:7-18, Ex. 34 at 154:8-160: 19. 
5. Google disputes UF 20 because the cited s:udics do not support the broad 
descriptions used. 'Those studi~s were not designed to test~ nor did they, the limited use of 
trademarks in text permitted by Google's 2009 policy. ';~hich only allows resellers, information 
siles and sites selling compatible parts to use the trademarked tenn in the ad title or ad text. 
Rather, they tested .ds such as "3 Dav Blindsl Oet Blinds & Shades up to 87% off! Free 
Shipping and Free Samplesl ·o\'\"w.selec.tblinds.com." and "M:J.ttress Discountersi Save Over 
60% on a Luxury Mahressl Pocket Coit and Latex Matt:-ess/ ",},n .. \'v.:.The~Matress-Co.cQm. 
Declaration ofKris Brewer, Ex. I; Lien Decl" Ex. 34 at 143:1-1 44:19 ; Spaziano Dec!. Exs. 13-
15. 
6. Google disputes UF 21 becau.se to be accurate it should read "the unrestricted use 
of trademarks in ad text ... . " Google continued to prohibit the use of trademarked terms in ad 
text from 2004-2009 when there was no t a [echnologically feasible way to automatica lly pennil 
certain uses reasonably believed to be legi timate. Googl:. also disputes the implication of UF 21 
and 22 that use of trademarks by reseUers ar;d others similarly affiliated ~"'ith a trademark owner 
could cause confusion as to whether such 2dvertisers are "somehow affiliated with the trademark 
owner or offerO those products.1> Lien Decl., Ex. )0 at 79:16-81:12; Lloyd Decl., Ex. 4 at 
GOOG-RS-0272840. 
7. Google disputes UP 23 because Dr. Edward Blair did not testify that consumer 
confusion would increase if "Rosetta Stone" were inserted in. ad text. Rather, Dr. Blair agreed 
that use of those words in connection with other language signifying a commercial transaction 
appe2red to increase confllsian i!S defined by Rosetta Stone's expert in his poorly designed study. 
Lien Dec!., Ex. 24 at 116:11-117:11, Errata Sheet Blair Dec!. ~~13-19. 
4 
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8. Google disputes UF 26 because Gcogle had no evidence by June 2009 (or 
curren~ly) that allowing only resellers, information sites and sites selling compatible parts to use 
trademarked terms in their ads would confuse users, In addition, Google developed a 
technologica! tool by which the webs ires linking to ads shown on Google could be automatically 
checked to assess the website's status as a reseUer or :nfonnarional site before an ad containing a 
monitored trademark term would be displayed. Lien Dec.l., Ex. 30 at 80:1&-81:5,88:16-90:22; 
Lloyd Decl. , Ex. 5. 
9. Google disputes the implication of UF 27 and 28 that "standard investigative 
practice" to pursue a Jaw enforcement action against a counterfeiter is how Google investigates 
rradern2rk infringement complaints. Google funher disputes UF 28 becallse Google. conducts 
due diligence to detennine whether advertisers may be selling counterfeit goods. Its AdWorcis 
policy <;nd Terms of Use prohibit the sale or promOtion of CQunterfeit goods. Google also uses 
a."l automated tool [Q check. the landing pages of ads to assess their compliance with its trademark 
policy. rn addition, Gcogle employs teams to enforce its trademark policy, respond to 
complaints about ads that violate its anti-counterfeit policy, and work to address problems with 
fraud and counterfeiting. Caruso Decl., Exs. 3, 53 at 36:5-37:16, 67 at 7:24-8:1 9,108:2-109'16, 
68 at 50:4-Sl:l0; Lloyd Decl., ~ 9, Ex,. 3, 4, 7; Louie Decl. ~~3-5: Lien Decl. Exs. 29 at 15:6-
17: II, 18:4-25, 19:25-20: 12, 21: 1-22: II, 26: 11-27: I, 30 at 87: 13-96: 18). 
10. Google disputes UF 31 because the implication that Google suggested that any 
particular advertiser bid on any particular trademarked keyword, or that it encouraged all 
advertisers to bid on trademarked terms is unsupported. Spaziano Dec\. Ex. 19. 
II. Google disputes UF 32 because the Keyword Tool and the trademark specific 
version of the Query Suggestion Tool neitbei provide trademarked ke}'·words directly to 
5 
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advertisers nor work as implied by UF 32. Google filters out trademark terms for which Google 
has received a legitimate complaint before the lists of ke)'"'\vord ideas arc provided to advertisers 
and info:ms them that tiley :Iare responsible for keywords you select and fer ensuring that your 
use of the keywords does not violate any applicable laws .. " In[~mal Google employees working 
with advertisers on their accounts may only use keyword tools in accordance with Google's 
trademark policies, including the Query Suggestion Tool, which crawls a particular website an 
advertiser identifies by inputting a URL. For advertisers not affiliated with the URL, the tool 
will return only a limited number of keyword ideas. CanlSO D~cl. Ex.. 54 at i9:8·16, 21 : 25 ~ 
22:11,23 :22-24:18); Lien Decl., Ex. 29 at 40:25-42:1 1, 58:1-25. 59;8-18, 30 at 124:10-17, 
125:11-20; Lloyd Decl., Ex.. 5,12; Spaziano Deel. Ex. 18 at GOOG-RS-0309888 to GOOG-RS-
0309893. 
12. Google disputes UF 35's use of the word "routinely." Sir:ce 2004, there have 
been more l"an 100,000,000 ads displayed through Gcogle's AdWords program that have a 
keyword that consists of Qr includes a Rosetta Stone mark or oilier allegedly similar mark 
identified by Rosetta Stone. Of all the clicks on those ads, less than 2% were on ads that Rosetta 
Stone contends were for counterfeit products. Caruso Dec1-, Ex. 50; Le Dec. at ~~ 3~6, passim. 
13. Google disputes UF 36 because no evidence supports that "paid advertisements 
fo r counterfeit Rosena Stone software incrcased markedly on Google's search results pages" or 
that Google's policies have anything to do with Rosetta Stone' s alleged counterfeiting problem. 
Rosetta Stone's COO testified tbat the increase in counterfeiting is in part due to Rosetta Stone's 
increased brand awareness, not Google's trademark policy_ Lien DecL Ex. 27 at 263:18-264:12. 
14. Google disputes the implication of UF 37 that it dots nor take down the ads that it 
says that it does. Rosetta Stone has no evidence to support that. Google 2.lso disputes the 
6 
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argument that its response is ::not sufficient" Google does not have the same level of knowledge 
that Rosetta Stone has abom countc:rfei[ Rosetta Stone products and is thus less able than Roset'"'12 
Stone to monitor sponsored links that may be advenising such products. Rosetta Stone admits 
that it cannot detennine if a product is counterfeit without physically inspecting it. Each witness 
who testified that they purchased counterfeit Rosetta Stone proouci did not know it was 
counterfeit until after they installed the sorrW'are and used it, some even took days to suspect that 
the product was counterfeit product. In addition, counterfeiters frequently attempt to circumve.nt 
the anti-counterfeiting measures Google has in pi ace. Google is incentivized to fight 
counterfeiting and fralld because they cost :t money. Googlc's Safety and Enforcement team 
helped Rosetta Stone and the Secret Service catch an international team of criminals using stolen 
credit cards to defraud Rosetta Stone of more than $1.5 million. Rosetta Stone's employees 
r:gulady complimer:ited Google's employees for their responsiveness. Caruso Dec!.. E)(.S. 21; 
23-29; 53 at 36:5-37:16, 61:13-63:1 I , 124:2-125:7; 65 at 130:25-138:25, 202:21-205:16; 67 at 
108:2-109:16; 68 at 127:3-128:20; Lien Decl., Ex,. 35 at 157:3-9; 33 at 131:7-132:19; Spaziano 
Decl., Tab A, Jeffhe, at 32:21-34:14; Doyle at 20:9-22:8; DuBow al 32:20-33:3, 38:18-40:7, 
43:1-10; Thomas al22:11-23:6, 24:14-25:4, 26:7-27:10; Porter at 28:6-23,32:2-22; Louie Dec!. 
~~ 3-6; Lloyd Dec. ~~ 9- 11; Calhoun Decl. ~~7, II & Ex,. B-C. 
15. Google disputes that UP 38 and 39 are relevant because none of the referenced 
cornplaint<; or actions deals with any confusion relating to the use of Roserta Stone's trademarks. 
16. Googie disputes UF 40 and 41 because review of the data referenced shows that 
none of ;he complaints in the sp~ified dale ranges definitively reference Google as the source of 
purchasing counterfeit products. Only 'three of the 2407 entries in two Rosetta Stone databases 







Rosetta Stone's own damages expert, all of the clicks on "pirate/competitor'l ads consiitute Jess 
than 2% of the total clicks on ads using Rosetta Stone keywords. Le Dec. at ~'i 3-6, passim. 
17. Google disputes UF 42 becaus~ one of Rosetta Stone's five "confusion" witnesses 
actually appears [0 have purcha.sed through an organic link and another disposed of the software 
before anyone cculd determine wheiher it was counterfeit Several of these witnesses tesiified 
that the .... vis ited Rosetta Stone's website and deliberatelv chose to visit other websites and 
- . -
continue shopping be-cause Roset+..a Stone's prices were too high. None of the witnesses believed 
they were buying directly from Rosetta Stone. Only three of the allegedly counterfeit products 
were produced or made available for insp~.ction in this action. Caruso OecL, Ei\..S .• 56 at 13:4-
14:2,50:3-14; 57 at 17:11-18:2, 18:9-16, 101:1-8: 71 at 12:24-13:23, 57:8-59:4: 74 at 71:22-
73:21, 74:12-75:6; Spaziano Decl., Tab A, Stanley Thomas at 13:1-7, 16:2 1-17:5: 24:7-13, 
39:15-42 :20,47:12-18: Porter at 12:24-13:22, 30 :10-12; 83:18-84:8; DuBow at 105:6-108:19; 
79: 11-81 :11; Jeffries at 25: I -26: I 9; Calhoun Decl., ~11. 
18. Google. disputes UF 43 because as a matter ~f law Terri Chen's and Rose Hagan ' s 
testimony is inadequate to provide evidence of actionable uactllal confusion." Lien Dec!. Exs. 25 
at 189:23-190: 19, 194: 1-195: 15; 30 at 159:21-163: 11. 
Google's Counter-Statement of Undisputed Fa<;ts (uGSFn) 
19. Rosetta Stone's target market is better educated and has higher income levels than 
'the general U.S. population. A three level bundle of Rosetta Stone's r~tails for around .$579. 
Caruso Decl., Exs. 34-35, 53 at 115:22- 1 16:5, 69 at 8'6:20-88: I. 70 at 115:9- t 16:5. 
20. Rosetta Stone has authorized resellers, including Amazon.com, Barnes & Noble, 
a.nd Borders, ' .... hien sell authentic Ros~ti.a Stone products originating from Rosetta . Stonc. 
Rosetta Stone entered agreements wiih Amazon.com and eBay that allow them to tiSC: Rosetta 
Stone's trademarks in connection with adve rtising. At times since 2004, Rosetta Stone has paid 
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affilis.te:s to refer tr;.ffic to its site2 and has had ':preferred affiliates,=" including 
CouponCactus.com, Dan Schoeffler, and Hvlware, which it authorized to u!e Rosena Stone's 
mark' in advertising. Caruso Dec\., Exs. 40-43, 58 at 96:12-98:10, 66 at 166:14-24, 176:2-14; 
Lien Ded., Exs. 10,28 at 206:2-207:19, 216:21-222:18, 223:17·227:12, 260:7-261:24. 
21. Approximately 3l% of Rosetta Stone's visitors are referred by Google, 2Jld a3 
many as 20% of the visitors to Rosetta Stone's site then return to Google after visiting the site. 
Lien Dec\., Exs. 2-9. 
ARGUMEi\'T 
1. ROSETTA STONE CANNOT PROVE DIRECT INFRlNGEMENT 
To prevail on its motion for directly liability, Rosetta Stone must prove that Google uses 
the Rosetta Stone marks in a manner likely to ~nfuse con:::umers. LamporeJ!o v. Falwell, 420 
F .3d 309, 312 (4[h Cir. 2005). As a matter of Jaw, Google does :10t Even if the law permitted a 
finding oi liability for referential and functional uses of a mark (it does not), and even if the 
Fourth Circuit recognized initial interest confusion in the internet context (it has not) , the recorc 
yields no evidence sufficient to support a finding of actionable confusion. 
A. Rosett61 Stone's Theo riescOfConfusion Are'Vrong. 
Rosetta Stone asserts two alternate theories of direct liability against Google: (1) initial 
interest confusion and (2) presumed confusion. The fU'st fails as a matter of law. The second is 
inapplicable because GoagJe is not attempting to pass off il'3 offerings as those of Rosetta Stone, 
1. Initial Interest Confusion Is Not Actionable In T his Circu it. 
Rosetta Stone's theory of direct liability against Google is premised on initial interest 
confusion-i.e., "the d~straction or diversion of a potential customer from the Web site he was 
initially seeking to another site." Rosetta Stone's Motion for Pa:-ti .. 1 Summary ludgment, Dh.'"'t. 
lQ3, at 17 (,RS Mot.") (citation; omitted). It conveniently neglects to mention that just two 
9 
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weeks after the decision it cites was iS5ued, the Fourth Circuit expressly declined to adopt initial 
inte~est confusion as a basis for infringement liability. Compare GEICO v. Google Inc, No. 
1:04cv507, 2005 U.S. Dis<. LEXIS 18642 (E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 2005) with Lampareilo, 420 F.J d at 
316. The Four-Ill Circuit rejecred the plai!ltiff's argumer-tt that initial interest confusion resulting 
from the defendant's registration of the domain n.ame vI'N"VJ.fa]lweILcom was actionable, halding 
that "we have never adopted the initial interest confusion theory," but rather have "followed a 
very different mode of analysis. requiring courts to detennine whether a likelihood of confusion 
exists by examining the allegedly infringing use in the context in which it is seen by {he ordinQ}Y 
consumer." Lamparello, 420 F.3d at 316 (internal quotation omitted). Such an analysis requires 
looking not only to the allegedly infringing use giv ing rise to the purported initial inter.est 
confusion, such as a domain name or f.d , ''but also to the underlying (content] of the website." 
id. at 318. 
Post-Lamparello, no court In the Eastern District of Virginia has used initial interest 
confusion as a basis for liability. See, e.g., Carl v. betnardjcarl.com, 662 FSupp. 2d 487. 496 
(E.D. Va. 2009) (,,(C]ontrary to pla.intiff's written assertion that the Founh Circuit has never 
rejected the so-called 'in itial interest confusion' theori. the court in Lamparello expressly 
declined to do 50.,,) .2 As a matter of poiicy. it makes sense that initial interest confus~on has not 
been embraced, particulaily on the internet where the costs of correcting a mistaken click are as 
minimal as hitting Lhe ba.ck button. 
:I: However, two courts in the Western District of North Carolina have. One ignored 
Lampareito entirely. Rauch industries, I/1c. v. P.JJdr.o, No. 3:07-c"-197-C, 2007 I\iL 3124647, *7 
(W.D.N.C. Oct. , 25, 2007). The other misconstrued ii to understand that "initial interest 
confusion liability is applicable where domain name and site content together give rise to 
confusion and opportunity tc profit financially from confusion." Asia Apparel Co. '.I. Cunneen, 
1\0. 3:02-ov-469, 2008 ViL 2949244, '3 (W.D.N.C. July 30, 2008). 
10 
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Although the Ninth Circuit recognizes liabilit'j fOi initial interest confusion on the 
internet, others have viewed its rationale as premised on u a material misch!lracreLization of the 
operation of internet search engines." J.G. Wentworth, S.S.c. LP. 'I). Settlement Funding, LLC, 
No. 06-0597, 2007 U.S. Dis!. Lexis 288, -22 (£.0. Pa. Jan-. 4,2007). As one court explained: 
At no point are porentia.1 consumers ''taken by a search engine" to defendant's 
website due to defendant's use ofpl2.intiff's marks in meta tags. Rather, ... a link 
to defendant's viebsite appears on the search results page as one of many choices 
for the potential consumer to investigate. As stated abo".le, the links to 
defendant ' s website always appear as independent and distinct links on the search 
result pages regardless of whether they are generated through Google's AdWords 
program or search of the keyword mela tags of defendant's website . 
fd. at ~22-23, "There is a big diffen::nc.e between hijacking a customer to another website by 
making the customer think he or she is visiting the trademark hoJder's website (even if only 
briefly) . . . and just distracting a potential customer with another choice, when it is clear that it is 
a choice." Playboy Enters., fnc. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1035 (9th Cir. 
2004) (Beaoo, 1., concurring). Even though a user might choose to visit a websire other than the 
plaintiff's, "such choices do not constitute trademark infringement off the internet." Id There is 
no reason they should on the intemet. See id. 
Even if this Circuit recognized an initial interest confusion theory: it would not be an 
actionable theory of direCt liability against GocgJe because Google "does not compete with the 
markho!der for sales," as required by LamparelloJ 420 F.3d at 317. Thus. the most initial interest 
confusion could theoretically support here is seconda:-y liability. And on this record, it cannot 
support that either. "[A] court cannot simpiy assume a likelihood of initial interest confusion, 
even if it suspects it . The proponent of such a theory must prove it." Vail Assocs. v. Vend-Tel-
Co., Ltd., 5t6 F.3d 853, 872 (tOth Cir_ 2008). In other words, the plaintiff must prove not just 
HIe "bait," but also the "switch.'· See Lamparello, 420 F.3d at 317. 
Simply no evidence in the record shows that any consumers were diverted fronr-i.e., set 
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out to find and did not reach-Rosetta Stone's website. To the contrary, the "confusicn 
witnesses" all visited Rosetta Stone 's website and deliberately chose-to visit other websites and 
continue shopping. OSF ~ 17. Tnis is consistent with Rosetta Stone's own documents, which 
show that approxim2.teiy 3i % of Rosetta Stene.'s visitors p,re referred by Google, and as many as 
20% of them retum to Google aner visiting Rosetta Stone's site. aSF ~ 21. 
Here, where Rosetta Stone lacks any actionable evidenc~ of confusion beyond the "initial 
interest" stage, and initial interest confusion is nOl 2clion~ble in the Circuit, or on this record, 
Rosetta Stone's summary judgment motion on trademark infringement must be denied. 
2. Confusion Cannot Be Presumed Here. 
This Circuit's likelihood of confusion presumption only applies where the defendant 
inti!ntionaI ly copies !hi! plaintiffs mark for irs use on its own competitive products with the 
intent to confuse or deceive the public. See Shakespe(Jl'e Co. v. Silslar Corp. of Am, 110 F.3d 
234, 241 (4th Cir. 1997) (presumption inapprupriaL~ where mark described "a functional aspect 
of the product"); Anheuser-Busch. lite. v. L&L Wiltgs, fltc., 962 F.2d 316. 321 -22 (4th Cir. 1992) 
(pr~umptjon inappropriate where mark was used for the purpose of parody). Further, the 
presumption does not arise simply because the defendant used the mark with an intent to benefit 
from the mark's reputation. Anheuser Busch, 962 F.2d at 321-22. 
The cases relied upon by Rosetta Stene in support of its presumption of confusion th~ory 
are all inapplicable because they im·olve either competitors or counterfeiters intentionally using a 
mark to pass off their goads ar services as those of the markholder. It is undisputed that Googie 
does not .provide competing or counterfeit goods, and Google is certainly not trying to pass off 
Google.com as Rosett3. Stone's website. Consequently. confusion cannot be presumed. 
B. Use Of Rosetta Stone Marks As Keywords Is Not Actionable. 
This Court has previously held that mere use of trademarks 2.S keywords is insufficient to 
12 
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establish Iiabi!it"j . GEICO, 2005 U.S. Disc LEXiS 18642 at "25-26 (dismissing claim because 
no resulting confusion was shown). Because confusion can only be shci\vn based on the text of 
the keyword triggered ads in context, and there is no evidence of confusion regarding those ads, 
Rosetta Stone 's infringement claim based on use of its marks as keywords necessarily faj Is. 
Additioilally, use of trademarks as keywords is functional and therefore not actionable 
because the Lanham Act ··does not protect essentially functional or uti litarian product features 
.... " Sega En",.s. Ltd v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1531 (9th Cir. 1992); 5" also 
Goagle's Motion For Summary judgment at l3·15. Just as \-',Iords in a book's iildex. identify 
relevant pa5!iages within the book. keywords in an inttmc::t search engine's index are the "keys" 
.that enable it to readily identify relevant information, whether they be organic search results (I.e., 
unpaid listings) or Spor::sored Links (Le., paid ads), responsive b searches conducted by users. 
Witl10ut the keywords, Google's ability to locale infonnation related to Rosena Stone' s products 
would be greatly impaired, robbing consumers of the a~i{jty e~ily to find reviews or t..~e best 
price and thwarting the «information~facilitating" goals of trademark law. See Qualitex Co. v. 
Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995). 
Use of Rosetta Stone's marks in PQst-ciomain URL addresses serves a similarly functional 
purpose-identifying a unique location on the internet. See Interactive Prods. Corp. 11. a2:z 
Mabile Office Solutions. fne., 326 F.3d 687, 696-98 (6th Cir. 2003) (use of a trademark in the 
p'ost-domain URL did not signify source of a product and thus was not actionable); Data 
Concepts, 1M. v. Digital Consulting, Inc., 150 F.3d 620, 627-2& (6th Cir. 1998) (Merritt, J., 
concurring) ("'Nbcn 2. domain name is used only to indicate an address on the internet and no! to 
identify the source of specific goods and. services~ the name is not functioning as a trademark." ). 
Although the URL displayed may be shonened for read2.bilit"j, it is simply used to identify ihe 
13 
6467 
web location to which the ad will direct users. Spaziano Decl., Tab A at Hagan Dep. 53:17-
56: 15. Because is not serving a source-identifying purpose of goods. it is nat actionable. 
C. Ads For Genuine Goods Do Not Infringe. 
The !ikelihood·of-confusion faclors a'pplied in cl2ssic tracemzrk infringement actions are 
piemised on a defendant using a mark to promote its own sales and therefore inappropriate 
where a mark is used to describe the plaintiff s products. E.g., Century 11 Real Estate Corp. \I, 
LendingTree, inc., 425 F.3d 211, 224 (3d Cir. 2005j (recognizing that "certain of the [traditional] 
factors applied mechanically would inevitably point towards likelibood of confusion where no 
likelihood of confusion may actually exist'); see also GEICO, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXrS 18642·.t 
'" 14. Accordingly. the discussion below focuses on focuses on intent of actual confusion= intent= 
and consumer sophistication, which arc the most· meaningful traditional factors [0 consider when 
a trademark is used to refer to the markowner or its goods. 
Rosetta Stone cannot credibly argue that because its marY.s appear on ads on Google.com, 
consumers are likely to confuse Google.com with Roser:a Stone. Thus, any assessment of 
likd ihood of confusion must focus on the specific ads Rosetta Stone claims to be infringing. 
Care First of Md., Inc. v. First Care. P.C .. 434 F.3d 263, 271 (4th Cir. 2006) ("[B]ecause the 
likelihood-of-confusion analysis looks to the actual use of competing marks, a comparison of the 
texts of the two marks alone !s insufficient if the marks have different appearances in the 
marketplace."); Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc. v. /-800 Contacts, Inc., 299 F.3d 1242, 
1248 (lith Cir. 2002) (reversing lower court for failing to conduct ad-by-ad analysis in fal.e 
advertising case). Yet Rosetta Stone fails tv analyze any specific ad. 
Although ad~by~ad analysis is necessary [0 assess liability. even a small sample of ads 
reveals that Roserta Stone cannot prove i:hat Google 's acts have caused a likel ihood of 
confusion-as opposed to be ing a mere link in the chain of enabling someone else's potentially 
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infringing acts . For purposes of illustration, the ads at issue can be separated into categmies: 
(i) ads by reselkrs and affiliates; (ii) ads by compe:itors; (iii) ads [or informational sites; (iv) ads 
for products unrelated to language education; and (v) ads for alleged counterfeit prodl!cts. 
1. Rosetta Stone's Trademarks Can Lawfully Be Used To Refer To 
Rosetta Stone and Its Products 
A century of precedent teaches that the Lanham Act does not bar the use of a mark to 
refer to a product originating from the trzdemark owner.) Such usc furthers irademark Jaw's 
purpose by helping consumers gE.ther information and quickly identify products. E.g. . Q1Jt!1ite:c 
Co., 514 U.S. ""163-64. 
i. ReseUers And Affiliates Can Lawfully Refer to Rosett:l Stone. 
Usc of Rosetta Stone marks by reseilers and affiliates to advertise actual Rosetta. Stone 
products or discounts on Rosetta Stone products is clearly iawful. E.g., Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, 
Inc., No. 0&-3947·ov, 2010 WL 1236315, '7 (2d Cir. Apr. t, 2010) ("eEay's use of Tiffany's 
mc.rk on its website and in sponsored links was lawful. eBay used the mark to describe 
accurately the genuine Tiffany goods offered for sale on its website."). Examples include: 
"Ros·etta L:anciuao'e" sale 
F.rrui2~:ccnYB-Q~e.~~~ne:. Top pmgra.'ll. ne.w Version 3. Ships fi-ee, n~ tax, order toda:,vt 
f2.% Rosetta 'Storie R~~ 
~UpCilC~s.c.i:n(Ros.eit~·StQn.e F'~&.2:-b.,.y Snipping .. 12% Cl!~h Beck on Ro~ettlJl Ston e Lar.gu;;gi! Somv;;r.,. 
Use ofRoset":.a Stone's marks by resellers who sell genuine Rosetta Stone products is also 
protected by the first sale doctrine. E.g .. Shell Oil Co. \I. Commercial Perro{eurn, Inc. , 928 F .2d 
104, l07 (4th Cir. 1991); see also Tiffany, 2010 WL 1236315 at '7-8; Sebastian Inl'l v. Longs 
; Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S . 125, 129-30 (1947); Presloneltes, Inc. 
v. Cory, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924); S=lehner v. Wagner, 216 U.S. 375, 380-8i (1910); Polymer 
Tech Corp., v. Mimrali, 975 F.2d 58,62 (2d Cir. 1992); Shell Oil Co. v. Commucia! Petroleum, 
Inc., 928 F.2d lO4, 107 (4th Cir. 199 i); Volkswagenwerk AktiengesellsdlOft v. Church, 411 F.2d 
350 (9th Ci r. 1969); Smith v. Chane!, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 563 (9th Cir. 1968); National 
Federation For the Blind. Inc. ". Loompanics Enters., Inc., 936 F. Supp. 1232, 124[-42 (D. Md. 
1996); Universal City SLUdi9S, Inc. v. Ideal Pub/'g Corp., [95 U.S.P.Q. 761 (S.D.NY. 1977); 
Forstmcmn Woolen Co. v. MurraySices Corp., l44 F. Supp. 283, 290 (SD.N.Y. 1956). 
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Drllg Stores Corp., 53 FJd 1073, 10i4-75 (9th Cir. 1995). And for some ads, Rosetta Stone 
contra.ctualiy authorized certain reseUers and affi[iates to use its trademarks in ccnnection with 
2Qvertising Rosetta Stone producls. Spccificaliy. it entered such agreements with Amazon, 
eBa),. Coupon Cactus, Dan Schoeffler, and fmware. (GSF ~ 20). As such, no .actionable 
confusion could be possible for the ads of [hese advertisers. 
it Competitors Can Lawfully Refer to Rosetta S tone. 
Tn.demark law penn its the use of trademarks to refer to the trademark owner or its 
prodl.lcts not just by reselJers, but also by competitors. Indeed, the Federal Trade Commi.'ision 
endorses the use of trademarked tenns in competitive advertis ing: to provide more information to 
consumers. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. 14.l5; see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. S&lvf Brands, inc. , 616 
F. Supp. 2d 581, 589-90 (E.D. Va. 2009) (refusing to enjoin advertising campaign where mark 
was clearly being used as comparative advertising); U-Haul fm 'l, inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 
F. Supp. 2d 123, 728 (E.D. Va. 2003) ("[CJornpara[ive advertising does not \l iolate trademark 
law, even when the advenising makes use of a compeci tor' 5 trademark."). The text of competitor 
ads sometimes futher ensure that consumers will not be confused because they "do not convey, 
but, on the contrary. exclude the m)tion that they are selling the plaintiffs goods." Sa:xlehner. 
216 U.S. at 380.t, For example, it is highly unlikely that a.nyone would think that the foHowing 
competitor ads originate from Rosetta Stone; 
4 See also LampareUa. 420 F 3d at 315 ("No one would believe that Reverer:d Falwell 
sponsored a site criticizing himself, his positions, and his interpreIations of the Bible .. "); Sa."'Cony 
Prods., Inc. v. Guerlain, Inc., 513 F.2d 716, 722 (9th Cir. 1975) (use of a trademark in 
comparative advertising does not violate Lanham act unless the ad was false or causes consumer 
to be confused about source of the trademarked good). 
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6awareihe Stone. £5481 
Occ~t e~! R!r.peo Off 8y Th'! Stone. 
Learn 5-);nish v;/ Awes,ornOl'€ 0".0 EEl 
U:JY e~omoEtttGtlCES.comJSp~1i:;il 
The Stone Prooram Sucks 
Sab-=1Yak Is E2.5.ier &, C:II.apaL 
Youll Sp .. k Uk" 2 ~ Russia.n. 
w· ....... ::.8ab!!.r(;k.-c::.r7l 
iii. Informational Sites C:m LawfuUy Refer to Rosetta Stone. 
An entity ne:ed nat be a reseller or 'competitor to lawfully refer to a product by its 
trademarked name. For example, in WeVB-TV v. Boston Athletic Association, L1.e Second 
Circuit held that the use of the plaintifrs mark, "Boston Marathon~" in a news broadcast iO 
«describe the event that Channel 5 will broadcast" did not constitute trademark infringement 
because "the law usually permits [the use of words for their descriptive purposes] even if the 
words themselves also constitute a trademark." 926 F.2d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 1991); see also New 
Kid.:; on rhe Block v. News Am. PubJ'g Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992) (use of trademark to 
refer to musical group in a survey W2S not actionable trademark infringement); Pirone v. 
MacMillan, Ille., 894 F.2d 579, 584 (2d Crr. 1990) (no trademark infringement where Babe 
Ruth's name and image were used '~in the primary sense--to identify a great baseball player"). 
Thus. uses of the "Rosetta Stone" mark such as the followi ng are entireiy lawful: 
Rose~ Stone 'IS. Others 
Don't Buy Rosetta Stone 
Until You R.:ad: These Reviews! 
Aboui..cQmlRosettaS(one 
Reviews for Rosetta stonl) 
Read expert. software reviews 
only at 9tigiltHub.corrl 
WWW.brtghthub.com 
iv. Entities Unrelated To Rosetta Stone Can Lawfully Use The 
Words "Rosetta" And ~'Stone" In Their Plain Meanings. 
r rademark law also permits the use of a trademark in its plain-English menning. 15 
U.S .C. 1115(b)(4). As the Supreme Court recognizes, "[tlh. use ofa similar name by another to 
truthfully describe his ov.n product does not constitute a legal or morel wrong, even if its effect 
be to cause the publie to mistake the origin or ownership of the product n KP Permanent lvfake-
Up, Inc., v. Lasting Impression I. Inc .. 543 U.S. III, 11'9 (2004) (citation omitted). Thus, 
Rosetra Stone has no right to block, for example, ads for "a wall plaque reproduction of the 
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actual Rosetta Stone" or actual stone from China or Mexico. Lien Decl. \ Exs. 12, 19, 37; CarUSQ 
Decl. Exs. 13, 50. In oL.~er words: ads such as the fo!lo\\o'illg are entirely lawful: 
2. 
Mexicarr Stone 
Oe:>er.dab/e Natiomvi<ie S~dce 
Qu;;;lity Materials &. Cra.1S01<in.shlp 
WAW .i2stfelic.:s::o ne.com 
A~Chinese stone oroduct 
sfab=. tiles. count~rtops. cartings 
Med2!fions. limEStone af.d slatss. 
w·'.rH.';:hln· .. miirhJe .~.orr.)index.l1tm 
Rosetta Stone Has No Evidence Of Likelihood of Confusion 
Concerning Ads For The Sale of Genuine Goods. 
The parties agree that actual confusion is "of paramount importance': and "the best 
evidence" of likelihood of confusion. RS MoL at 20. !ndeed, "the absence cf aerual confus ion 
in the marketplace provides the most compelling evidence of no likelihood of confusion." 
Cipher(rusl, Inc. v. Trusecure Corp., No. 1:04cv1232, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46322, at ·46 
(E.D. Va. Nov. 28, 20D5) (alteration om~tteci) . On this vital pOlnt, Rosetta Smne's proof fails. 
Uilsurprisingiy, Rosetta Stone cannot cite to a!l:y evidence ofact!onable confusion arising 
from ads promoting or referencing genuine goods. See RS Mot. at 20-21. Inslead, it relies on 
general, dated statements made by Google employees about the 2004 trademark policy and 
internal Google experiments from six years ago rcgardir.g conSLlmcr impressions of ads making 
usc of a very small set of third-party trademarks. This so-called "evidence," which contains no 
reference to 2. single::d that used a RoselLa Stone mark, is irrelevant here.s It amounts to nothing 
more remarkable than the statement of Ms'. Rose Hagan, Googl~'s then-sernar trademark lawyer, 
that "we just den 't bel ieve users are likely to be confused unless there is something in the ad text 
5 As Rosetta Stone admits, the confusion at issue ;n this case is confusion as to source of 
goods. RS Mot. at 17. Not only does "confusion" beN/een organic and sponsored links have 
nothing to do with whether users are confused as to the source or origin of Rosetta Stone's 
products. but the evidence shows that any such "confusion" is not probative of anythlng except 
that consumers do not always have a perfect understanding of how things work. For eX(I.mpJe, 
some users believe {hat all I inks on a search results page are paid links, so it makes no difference 
to such a user wnether a link is on the right or left hand o.f a search results page. OSF ~ 4. 
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that is c.ausii1g thai confusion," RS Mot. at 8, 21, which is entirely consistent with the law. 
Rosetta Stone's reliance on {his S'"l2.tement only highlights L.'"Iat-for the sir years since Goog!e 
adopted the 2004 keyword policy (and the ten months since it adopted the 2009 policy)-Rosetta 
Stone still lacks proof that anyone has acruaHy been confused by even a single ad that used its 
mark. in connection with advertising genuine goods. 
Ncr is there any evidence in the record that Google intended to confuse potential 
purchasers of Rosetta Stone's products. The only "evidence" Rosetta Stone points to as proof cf 
Google's supposedly bad intent is Google's knowledge that branded keywords and use of 
tradern:!rks in ad text can result ia higher click through rates for ads. R.S Mor. At 23. How these 
two facts satisfy Rosetta Stone's burden of proving that Google used Rosetta Stone marks with 
the intent to confuse the buying public is a mystery. Cf. Anheuser-Busch, 926 F.2d at 322 
(holding that intl'!nt to benefit d~s not equate to -intent to confuse). It should not be surprising to 
anyone: (hat users searching on Google.com·for "Rosetta Stone software" are more likely to click 
on an ad informing them that the advertiser sells «Rosetta Stone" software than on an ad that 
does not. The undisputed record shows thai Google's success as a company is dependent on 
providing users a positive experience. Caruso Decl., Ex.. 76, 175 :22-177:16. Google cannot do 
so by intentionally confusing Google users seeking information relevant to.their queries.6• 
Google's operation under the 2004 trademark policy for five years does not prove 
anything nefarious about its motive in adopting the 2009 policy. It would have been entirely 
Iz\vful at any time for Amazon.com to use '"Rosetta Stone" in its ads on Google.com to inform 
Ii If Google solely wanted to enhance click-through rates for a short-tenn revenue bump, 
it could aliow anyone to USt trademark terms in the text of ads and respond purely reactively--or 
not at all. Google is financially motivated, however, not to take such a. myopic approach, and 
instead focuses cn trying to display ads that consumers ' find relevant and useful with an 





users that Rosetta Stone products were available for S1!ie on Amazon. See Section I.e. 
How~ver, it was only a.r..'1er Google developed the tedulOlogical ability to actorn2.te the' checking 
of landing pages to confinn that advertisers were offering a trademarked product for sale that 
Goog!e modified its tr2demaik policy to allow advertisers to identify what they are offering. 
OSF ~~ 6, S. Google pennitting such referential and indexing uses of trademarks in no way 
evidences intentionll consumer deception. See Sax/ellner. 216 U.S. ai 3S0~81 (rejecting unfair 
Gompetition claim where mark was used referentially to describe a type of water similar to 
plaintifrs because the use was "not uying to get the good will of the nerne, but the good will of 
the goods"). 
The sophis.tication of the market also renders confusion un likely. Roser'tA Stone is 
incorrect that the relevant market here is the public at izrge. RS Mot. at 24. Presumably, Rosetta 
Stone equates Googlc's market for search engine users with the public 2t large, but tl1e pool of 
Googie users at issues encompasses only those who might potentially be confused-i.e., those 
who would type in a search query consisting of a Roset"~ Stone trademark. These users, who 
necessarily have unaided recall of the Rosetta Stem: lrddernark, 2re certainly fewer than Ule 
"public at latge." Camso Dec!., Ex. 33 (showing unaided br~nd recall of 15% in 2007). 
Here, potential purchasers of Rosetta Stone products are more highly educated and 
sophiSiicated than the public generally. GSF Y 19. Given the high price of Roselta Stone's 
products, which retail for around $579 for a three-level bundle (id.), and the tim~ commitment of 
learning a language, Rosetta Stone's potential customers are also more likely to spend time 
researching cnd learning about the software. Lien Dec1., Ex. ~6 at 96:J4 ~97:ll, 99:3~101:22. 
These facts diminish the likdihood of confusion. See Star indus., Inc. v. Bacardi & Co., 412 
FJd 373, 390 (2d Cir. 2005) (affLrming that liquor store customers considering Si2 to 524 
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purchases are sophisticated); Barbecue Mem:, Inc. v. 551 Ogder., Inc., 235 F.3d 1041, 1045 (7th 
Cir. 2000) (clear error not to consider consumers choosing 2 $20 restauraitt mea! sophisticated). 
D. Google Is Not Direct ly Liable Far Ads For Allegedly Counterfeit Products. 
To the extent Rosetta Stone's marks' were lEed to advertise counterfeits, Liat fact, if 
proven, is relevant only to whether Google is secondarily liable fer infringement, and is wholly 
irrelevant to direct infringement liability. Tiffany, 2010 \VL 1236315 at *7-8 (affirming 
judgment of no direct infringement). In Tiffany's trademark infringement action age.inst eBay 
for allegedly offering and ad\:ertising counterfeit Tiffany products on its websire, the district 
court found that, while perhaps noc as high as 73%, "a significant.?Ortion of the 'Tiffany' sterling 
silver jewelry listed on the eBay webs ite ... was counterfeit." lei. at "'2. In addition, Tiffany had 
submitted thousands of nor ices of counterfeit listings to eBay. ld. at '" to. Yet the Second Circuit 
concluded that eBay could not be held directly liable for infringement based on the counterfeits: 
"eSay's knowledge "Vel non that counterfeit Tiffany wares were offered through its website is 
relevant [only] to the issue of whether eBay contributed to the direct infringement of Tiffany's 
mark by the counterfeiting vendors themselves." ld. at +7. 
Likewise, direct H3biliry cannot be imposed on Google, which is even further removed 
from any sale of counterfeit goods. Unlike eBay, Google does not offer the venue at which 
products are sold, but merely displays advertising [or those venues, and. un like the "significanf' 
number of counterfeit listings there, less than 2% of the clicks on ads that used a Rosetta Stone 
trademark '(I'ere. on ads for allegedly counterfeit products. OSF «jJ 16. Holding Google directly 
liable for such ads wou ld not only inhibit the lawful resale of genuine Rosetta SlOn~ products, 
but would also inhibit the lawful exchange of information about Rosetta Stone, about language 
learning products genereily. and about things having no commercial relationship v·"haLSoever to 
Rosetta Stone, such as the historic artifact. Tiffany, 2010 WL 1236315 at '7 ("To impose 
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liability be:::at!sc eBay cannot guarantee the genuinenes$ of ail purported Tiffany prodl.!cts 
offer~d on its website would unduly inhib il the lawful resale of genuine Tiffany goods."). 
There is also no actione.ble evidence of confusion regarding ads for allegedly counterfeit 
goods. Rosetta Stone must prove thet each ad it contends offered counterfeit goods actually did 
so-as opposed to, for example, genuine product acquired through individual retail sale, surplus 
acquisition, or international purchase. Rosetta Stone has no such proof because the only way to 
determine with certainr-j whether a product is counterfeit is to physically inspect it. OSF ~ 14. 
Only three allegedly counterfeit products have been produced Or made available for inspection. 
OSF -; 17. Assuming that. Rosetta Stone satisfies its burden of proof as to the counterfeit nature 
those three items, the record evidence is still insufficient find Iiability~ it is de minimus. 
"[E]v idence of the num~er of instances of actual confusion must be placed against the 
b'ackground of the number of opportunities for confusion before one can mak(:' an informed 
decision as to the 'l-veight to be given the evidence." George & Co., LLC v. Imagination Entm't 
Ltd., 575 F.3d 383, 398 (4th Cif. 2009) (citation omitted}. For example, this Circuit has held that 
four instances of actual confusicn among 500,000 units sold is de minimis evidence of confusion. 
Id. at 399. Here, mare than 100,000,000 Rosetta Slone ad impressions were ser .... ed since 2004, 
yet Rosetta Stone has identified only five individuals who purport to be confused by use of the 
"RO$ETI A STOl\fE" mark.' Caruso Decl., Ex. 50. This is de minimis as a maner of law. 
Cases cited by Roseto Stone do not dictate otherwise. In Sara Lee Y. Kaysu-Roth Corp., 
the court found a likelihood of confusion where the "record [was) replete with anecdotal 
7 Five is a generous count because, of the fiv::, one apparently purchased the allegedly 
counterfeit goods 2~r clicking or. an organic listing and is thus irrelevant to the confusion 
reSUlting from sponsored links, and another disposed of her software before it could be 
confmned as counterfeit, and another's was riot available during discovery. OSF ~ 17. 
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evidence of consumers throughout the nation confusing the L' eggs(R) and Leg Looks(R) 
marks." 81 F.3d 455, 466 (41h Cir. 1996). The plain1iff produced evidence of not oniy ,ix 
women who were confused, but also "nearly overwhelming" ane:.dotaJ evidence that included 
{tstimony from service mercbandisers who told of c:mfusion among consumers and '"massive 
confusion" among store personnel, as well as survey evidence showing approx.imately 3Q-40% 
confiJsion among the consum:ng public. Jd. at 466-67. Similarly, in X-It Prods., LLC ..... Walter 
Kidde Po/1able Equip., Inc., 155 F. Supp. 2d 577, 623-24 (E.D. Va. 2001). the court denied 
summary judgment in favor of defendant where the defendant failed to rebut the presumption 
that it copied the plaintiffs mark with an intent to confuse the pUblic and the plaintiff produced 
evidence of a consumer survey showing 40% confusion in addition to actual instances of 
confusion. 
Unlib:: the u l1carly overwhelming" anecdotal evidence of umass ive confusion" in Sara 
Lee, and the 40% confusion rate shown by the ... t:'lt survey. the totality of Rosetta Stone's 
ev idence of confusion consists of five witnesses who claim to have purchased counterfeit 
products. Rosetta Stone has produced no documents, call reports; email complaints. or other 
records to show "rampant confusion" among consumers relating to Google.! 
The record does establish, however, that these alieged "confusion" witnesses were not 
confused by Sponsored Links on Google into mistakenly believing that they were clicking on ad 
that would link them to Rosena Stone' s website. They atl knew how to find Ros:::tta Stone's 
Though Rosetta Stone produced records from its customer care center regarding 
complaints of counterfeit software, the vast majority of those complaints identified no 
connection to Google whatsoever. A large portion of the complaints involved customers who 
had purchased through spam emaiis which clearly did not come from Google's Sponsored Links. 
,Many more involved eBay and Craigslist sales. One complaint even dealt with a customer who 
"said he met with someone in the mall who was dresseri in a yenow Rosetta Stone shirt selling 
the program." asp ~ 16; Lien Dec!., Ex. 22. 
23 
6477 
website through Google and none believed that he or she was buying from Rosetta. Stone 
directly. OSF ~ 17. Indeed, several testified that they did not purchas. frem Rosetta Stone 
directly in the first instance because the software was more ex.pensive there. OSF ~ 17.9 
II. ROSETTA STONE CANNOT PROVE SECONDARY LIABILITY 
A finding of secondary liability requires a finding of primary liability. E.g. , PeJfect jO, 
Inc. v. Visa Inl'/ Service, Association, 494 FJd 788,807 (9ill Cir. 2007). As set forth in Section 
I, Rosetta Sione cannot on this record meet its burden of proving direct liabil ily by anyone. See 
also RS Mot. 24-26. Even if direct infringement could be established. Rosetta Stone has no 
evidence to support holding Google s~condarily liable: for any ~uch infringement. 
A. Google Is Not Liable for Contributory Infringement. 
To establish that Goog!~ is contributorily liable, no genuine issue of disputed fact may 
exist as to whether Google "intentionaHy induces another to infringe" or "continue:; to supply its 
product to one whom it knows or h(l.s reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement." 
Inwood Labs., Inc. v. !ves Labs., !lIC., 456 U.S. 844, 854 ( 1982); Size, Inc. v. Ner.vorkSolutians, 
inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 568, 572 (E.D. Va. 2003). Rosetta Slone cannot mee' this burden. 
Inducement necessari ly requi res that the defendant 'intend/or a third par{v (0 infringe 
Rosetta Stone's efforts to manufacture "actual confusion" through Google's lawyers 
dtpositions is likewise unavailing. Testimony of Google's current and former Senior Trademark 
Counsel that they could not confum which ads on printouts of Google.com search pages 
prepared by Rosetta Stone' 5 counsel were and wen~ nor for counterfeit Rosetta Stone products is 
completely irrelevant to actual confusion. OSF 'J S. Because RGseITa. Stone has no evidence that 
either is in the relevant pool of ccns:Jmers-i.e., users likely to conduct a search on Google using 
a RlJsena Stone trademark for any non-litigation purpose-they cannot qualify as "actually 
confused." See, e.g., Pacl7,ral1 v. Chicago Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628, 64j (7th Cir. 2001); 
DecoraJiansjor GeneraJions, Inc. v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 128 Fed. Appx. 133,139 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (unpublished) .. Far from supporting Rosetta Stone's case, this testimony belies its position 
that Go.ogJe should have been able to identify ads for counterfeit products by just looking at 
them. something Rosetta Stone's witness admitted is not possible. OSF ~ 14. 
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the mark. lv<s, 456 U.S. at 860 (Wllite, J., concurring)." This high le,,1 of intent is rarely 
found. 11 And it cannot be here. There is no evidence that Google intended for any counterfeiters 
(or any other advertiser) to infringe Rosetta Smne's marks. Rosetta Stone's inducement theory is 
based almost entirely on the mere :xistence of Google's neutral advertising tools, which simply 
look to historical adverliser and user behavior data to algorithmically predict relevant search 
queries for any given ad. The only one of these tools available to advertisers filiers out all 
t 'adernarlc terms for which Gocgle has received 2. legitimate complaint OSF ~ I!. Google 
employ.::es use the other tools to assist Google's larges t customers to optimize their ad 
campaigns, alwa}'s in accordance with Google's 2009 trademark policy. which only allows 
limited and lawful use of trademarked renns· in text by cenain ad\·ertisers. such as rescUers . /d.; 
see also Section I.e. Nothing in the record is to the contrarf. nor does any evidence support a 
finding that any counterfeiter actually used one of Googlc's tools to infringe Rosetta Stone's 
trademarks. Indeed, it is rather absurd for Rosetta Stone to argue that counterfeiters. having 
already decided to stamp their counterfeit products with R05.ctta Stone's marks as p£t-t of the 
very core of their counrerfeiting enterprise, decide to use Ros::tta Stone marks for ads on 
GoogJe.com as .a resul t ofGoagle's keyword tools. Even i f they did, that would faH far short of 
proving that Google intended for them to in[Tinge Rosetta Stone's marks as required under ives. 
lC Cf Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, [nco v. Grokster. Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936-937 
(2005) (inducement of copyright infringement requires that the defendant "distributes a device 
WIth the object of promoting iIS use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other 
affinnative steps taken to foster infringement''); Sony Corp. of A.l?z. v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, n.19 (1984) (recognizing contributory trademark infringement is much 
narrower than under copyright law). 
II We could locate only one decision since lves where a party was found to have 
induced trademark infringement: Sealy, Inc. v. Easy Living, Inc., 743 F.2d [378, 1381-1382 (9ih 
Cir. 1984) (holding seller end manufacturer of bedding products contributorily liable where they 
"foresaw and intended that Pacifica [mattress] foundat ions WO!.lld be passed off as Sealy 
products" and advertised the Pacifica product as a Umatching fo:.tndation" for the Sealy mattress). 
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Google affirmatively seeks to prevent counterfeiters from advertising on Google.com. 
Among other ihings. Google: expressly prohibiis ads for counterfeit goods; it takes down 
counterfeit ads when it learns of their existence; it has 2: team dedicated to fighting ads for 
counterfei[ goods; it even works closely ia'.-Y enIorcemen~ and brand Q\\.ners, inciuding Rosetta 
Stone specifically, to combat and disrupt counterfeitir:g in the U.S. and elsewhere. OSF ~ 14. 
Google is financially incentivizeci to keep counterfeit ads off of its website. Such ads not 
only cost Goagie money, bUl they also create a bad user experience-the worst possible outcome 
from Google's perspective. since its business depends on users returning to its site !o click on 
.d,. Jd.; Lien Dec. Ex. 34 at 70:4-22. Accord Tiffany, 2010 WL i2363J5 at *13 ("(PJrivate 
market forces give eBay and those operating similar businesses a strong incentive to minimize 
the counterfeit goods sold on their websites."). Common sense dictates that Google users who 
click on a counterfeit ads are less likely to click on ads in the future, which is bad for bus iness. 
Nor has Google continued to provide its services (0 advertisers it knows or has reason to 
know are advertising counterfeit products. PlaintiITs "bear a high burden in establishing 
' knowledge' of contributory infringement, nnd (J courts have been reluctant !o extend" 
contributory tradtmark liability to defendants where there is some uncertainty as to the extent or 
the nature of the infringement" Tiffany, 2010 WL 1"236315 at to-I 1. For example, eBay 
ieceived thousands of notices from Tiffany complaining of counterfeiting and received more 
than 100 complaints from customers who had purchased counterfeit Tiffany produc.ts on eBay's 
website. Id. at ·2. 10. Nevertheless, the court rejected Tiffany 's argument that its notices to 
eBay imposed an affirmative duly on eEay's to stop counterfeiters from advertising, holding that 
"contemporary knowledge of which particular listings are infringing or will infringe in fue future 
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is 8-ecessaryl> to find sufficient llJ10wledge to impose liability. Id at "' II . i2 
Here, there is no evidence that Google had knowledge of ads for counterfeit products 
apart from the notices it received from Rosetta Stone because counterfeit Rosetta Stone software 
cannot be identified except by physically inspecting it. OSF ~14. Rosetta Stone's own evidr.nce 
shows that Google removed ads for allegedly counterfeit sites that it notified Google of. fd. 
Although it may be true ihat some un identified counterfeiters will try to CirCl.i.rrwenr Google's 
policies and place zds on Google.com anyway, this genera l knowledge is insufficient as a matter 
of law [0 hold Google liab le for contributorj infringement TUJany, 2010 \VL 1236315 at "" [ 1 
Cgeneral knowledge or reason to know that its serv ice is being used to seH counterfei t goods" is 
not sufficient to impose liability).13 
B. Google rs Not Liable for Vicarious Infringement 
Vicarious trademark infringement requires that GoogIe and the direct infringers "' have an 
apparent or actual partnership, have ~uthority to bind one another in transactions with third 
parties or exercise joint ownership or control over the infringing produc.t , ,, Perfect j 0, lr.c .• 494 
F.3d at 807 (quoting Hard Rock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1150). In this case, the relationship between 
II Rosetta Stone ' s cases are inapposite. In Bauer- Lamp Co., Inc., v. Shaffer, t.."Ie Eleventh 
.Circuit did not app ly the Inwood standard but ex~-nined contributory liability based on whether 
the defendant "knowingly participate[d} in furthering the trade dress infringement." 941 F.2d 
1 !65 at 1I71 (lIth Cir. 1991). The TransdermaI Prods., Inc. \'. Perjor"1ance Conlract 
Packaging, [nc., 943 F. Supp. 551. 552 (E.D. Pa. 1996), ccurt considered· whether a third party 
could be joined under Rule 1 4~ and determined that it could because the third party "could be 
liable" on a theory of contributory. infringement. Id. at 554. 
13 To impose an affirmative duty on Google to monitor and enforce the rights of third 
party trademark holders, as Rosetta Stone is seeking, would run directly counter IQ settled case 
law and sound trademark policy. which place that duty squarely on the shoulders of brand 
owners themselves. Se.e Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc. , 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008), aIf'd Tiffany, 2010 \\OL 1236315; s .. aiso, Hard Rack Cafe Licensing Corp. v. 
Concession Services. Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1149 (7th Cir. 1992). Indeed, it wo~ld render 
operation of Go ogle 's website impossible. 
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GoogIe and advertisers fails to satisfy tl:tis incredibly high standard. 14 
Rosetta Stone can point to no evidence establishing that Google has this type of 
pa.rtnership arrangement with any alleged counterfeiters-nor is such an arrangement even 
alleged in its operative Complaint, Dk't. 86; ~~ 90~99.lS. That Gocgle and any alleged direct 
infringer may have a financial relationship is insufficient [0 establish joint ownership and control 
for purposes of vicarious trademark liability. See Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 807-08; Fare Deals, 
LTD. v. World Choice Travel. com, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 678, 685-86 (D. Md. 2001) (affiliate 
agreement not enough to show agency relationship). Vicarious liability c~nnot be imposed on 
this record. 
III. ROSETTA STONE CANNOT PROVE DILUTION 
It is undisputed that Google does not use Rosetta Stone's marks to identify Google's 0\\11 
goods and sen, ices. As such, Google cannot be held liable for the uses of Rosetta Stone's 
trademark claimed to be dilutive. See Tiffany. 2010 \\iL 1236315 at Ijo 15 (holding that there is no 
dilution when there is «no second mark or product at issue" to blur Oi tarnish the senior mUk). 
Although counterfeiting may dilute Ro'setta Stone 's marks, as long as Google does not "itself sell 
" Cj Microsoft Corp. v. Black Cat Computer Wholesale, Inc., 269 F. Supp . ld 118, 
122-123 (W.D.N.Y. 2002) (bolding wife vicariously iiable where she and her husband owned a 
company that sold counterfeit Microsoft productS and she drew a salary from the company, 
shared responsibility of the day-to.day operation and rnanE.gement of the business, was 
personally responsible for all of the finances of the company: and was personally aware of the 
infringement because she: received and signed for the first cease and desist letter). 
IS Instead, Rosetta Stone argues that vicarious trademark infringement car: be found 
when Lite d:fendant has a "legal right and practical ability to stop or limit" infringement standard. 
RS MSJ pg. 26 {citing Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1173 (9th Cir. 
2007) . The standard articulated in Perfect In \I. Amazon.com is for vicarious copyright 
infringement, i.e ., it is the wrong standard. Jd. ; cf Perfecl 10 v. Visa in! Of Servo Assoc., 494 F.3d 
at S07 (applying trademark standard). The one trademark infringement decision Rosetta Stone 
cite that recites that standard addressed a motion to dismiss- a much lower burden of proof. 
GEICO v. Google J; • .c., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 702 (E.D. Ifa. 2004). 
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the goad~ at jsslle, it (does] not itself engage in dilution." Id. IS 
Even if third parry use of Rosetta Stone's marks could give rise to Google's liabiHty for 
dilution, Rosetta Stone cannot show that its marks were famous by May of 2004, which it 
concecies was when Googie's a;legedly dilutive acts begar.. RS Mot. at 28; 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1 1 25(c)(2)(A) (requiring fame at the time defendant's use of the mark began); OSF 11. 
Roserta Stone alsa cannot show ham by dilution or ta.rnishrnent. Similarity in the marks 
used by the counterfeiters and Rosetta Stone's marks, see RS Mot. at 28, is not sufficient. 
ROSCtt2 Stone admits tha.t its brand awareni:SS has never decreased since Google changed its 
trademark policy in 2004, and instead has skyrocketed. aSF 11. Nor has Rosetta Stone's brand 
~quiry (the positive association with the brand) declined during the relevant time frame; it has 
only increased. Id.. Even the third parties who _purchas::d allegedly counterfeit goods made it 
dear that they did not have a reduced opinion of Rosetta Stone. Id. For each of these reasons 
independently, Rosetta Stone's motion regarding dilution claim must fail. 
IV. ROSETTA STONE CANNOT PROVE UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
To prevail on its unjust enrichment claim, Roserta Stone must show that (1) it conferred a 
benefit on Google; (2) Google knew of the benefit and should have reasonably expected to repay 
Rosc ... r.a Stone for it; and (3) Google accepted or retained the benefit without paying for its value. 
Schmidt v. HOllSehold Fin. Corp .• II, 276 Va. 108,116 \'fa. 2U08). It cannot 
First, Google has not "taken" any benefit from Rosena Stone. A trademark owner has no 
property right in its mark beyond the right to prevent consumer confusion as to source of its 
)6 None of the authority cited by Rosetta Stor.e is to the contrary; it all inval '/es 
instances of a defendant brandi."1g its product with the plaintiffs trademark or a variation of it. 
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goodsY Unless Google's actions violate Rosetta Srone's trademark rights, Rosetta Stone has no 
piOof that Google took any benefit that rightfully belonged to ROSella Stone. Rosetta Stone cites 
no contrary cases. Cf in re Bay Vista oj Va., Inc., 2009 WL 2900040 (£.D. Va. June 2, 2009) 
(denying. motion to dismiss claim based on allegedly improper accounting in a bankruptcy 
proceeding). Second, there is also no evidence that Google promised, or should have reasonably 
expected, to pay Rosetta Stene for its non-infringing uses of RoserlA Stone's mark. Unde: 
Virginia law, "[alne may not recover under a theory of implied contract simply by showing a 
benefit to the defendant, v.-ithout adducing other facts to raise an implication that th~ defendant 
promised to pay the plaintiff for such benefit" Nedrich v. Jones, 245 Va. 465, 476 (1993) 
(zifirming dismissal of a breach of implied contract). Because no such facts exist here, Rosetta 
Slene's motion must be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
For the forego ing rea.iOns and upon all papers submitted in connection with its 
Opposition, Google respectfully requests that Roseaa Stone's Morion For Partial Summary 




17' E.g., PreSion,lIes, inc. v. Coty, 264 U.s. 359, 368 (1924) ("A trade-mark only gives 
ihe right to prohibit the use of it so far as to protect the owner's good wiU against the sale of 
another's product as his."); United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectollus Co .. 248 U.S. 90, 97, (1918) 
(trademark law's "function is simply to designate the goods as the product of a particular trader 
and to protect his good will against the sale of another's product as his; and it is not the subject 
of property except in connection with an existing business."). 
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